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Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by problems with social-
communication, restricted interests and repetitive behavior. A recent and thought-
provoking article presented a normative explanation for the perceptual symptoms of autism
in terms of a failure of Bayesian inference (Pellicano and Burr, 2012). In response, we
suggested that when Bayesian inference is grounded in its neural instantiation—namely,
predictive coding—many features of autistic perception can be attributed to aberrant
precision (or beliefs about precision) within the context of hierarchical message passing
in the brain (Friston et al., 2013). Here, we unpack the aberrant precision account of
autism. Specifically, we consider how empirical findings—that speak directly or indirectly
to neurobiological mechanisms—are consistent with the aberrant encoding of precision in
autism; in particular, an imbalance of the precision ascribed to sensory evidence relative to
prior beliefs.
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INTRODUCTION
The challenge of inferring the causes of our sensory inputs—
arguably the goal of successful (optimal) perception—is twofold.
Firstly, different causes can generate the same sensory input: the
shadow that takes the form of a rabbit can be caused by a real
rabbit or my hands configured to look like a rabbit. This inherent
ambiguity induces something called an “inverse problem” for
perception that can only be resolved in terms of prior beliefs about
how our sensations are generated. The second problem is that it
is not sufficient just to identify a plausible explanation for sensa-
tions, we also have to estimate the confidence we place in sensory
evidence, relative to our prior beliefs. Disregarding, or failing to
accurately estimate, confidence in sensory information—when
making perceptual inference—would be like making a statistical
inference without knowing the standard error of some estimated
treatment effect. Just as statistical inference would be invalid if
the standard error was not estimated properly; our perceptual
inference would be sub-optimal if the estimation of confidence
in sensory evidence, relative to prior beliefs, was compromised.
From a Bayesian perspective, our senses are bombarded with
input from the world and our brain is constantly generating
hypotheses about the causes of the sensory evidence it receives.
These hypotheses can be regarded as prior expectations, which are
generated over multiple timescales, from milliseconds to minutes,
and over multiple levels of (hierarchical) description, from visual
patterns to facial expressions. Predictive coding formulations
of perception (e.g., Friston, 2005; Bastos et al., 2012) propose
that expectations in higher brain areas generate top-down pre-
dictions that meet bottom-up stimulus-bound signals in lower
hierarchical (sensory) areas. The discrepancy between the sensory
input and descending predictions of that input is known as the
prediction error. This prediction error reports what stimulus-
associated information is “newsworthy” in the sense that it was
unpredicted and informative. This information is passed up the
hierarchy to inform higher-level expectations, which subsequently
generate better predictions and thereby resolve prediction errors.
The influence of (top-down) prior beliefs, relative to (bottom-
up) sensory evidence, is controlled by the precision, or confidence
placed in prediction errors at each level of the hierarchy (Friston,
2008). A high sensory precision will increase the influence of
ascending prediction errors by turning up the “volume” of sen-
sory channels in which we place more confidence. Conversely,
a low sensory precision, relative to the precision of prediction
errors higher in the hierarchy, will bias perception towards prior
beliefs. Crucially, if the predictive coding account on offer is
true, precision itself has to be estimated, much like estimating a
standard error in statistics, in terms of its expectation. This leads
to the notion of expected precision. In what follows, we will use
precision to mean expected or subjective precision.
In predictive coding schemes, action and perception attempt to
minimize prediction errors induced by sensory input at all levels
of the hierarchy—to optimize posterior beliefs (expectations)
about the causes of sensations, at multiple levels of abstraction.
In this setting, perception is the process of minimizing prediction
errors by providing better top-down predictions, while action
minimizes prediction errors through a selective sampling of sen-
sory input to ensure it conforms to our predictions. Crucially,
both action and perception rest on an optimal representation of
uncertainty; namely the precision of prediction errors at different
hierarchical levels. This precision itself has to be estimated and
deployed in an optimal way. Previously, we proposed that high
level (prior) precision may be attenuated in autism, relative to
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sensory precision (Friston et al., 2013). In other words, in autism
there may be a failure to attenuate sensory precision and contextu-
alize sensory information in an optimal fashion. For example, an
individual who always expects a high sensory precision would, to
some extent, be a slave to their senses, affording sensations dispro-
portionate weight in driving beliefs about their world. We will see
below that, physiologically, optimizing precision corresponds to
neuromodulatory gain control of neuronal populations reporting
prediction error. This provides an important link between abnor-
malities of neuromodulation and false inference under predictive
coding—a link we now pursue in the context of autism.
In what follows, we critically review neurobiological evidence
consistent with an aberrant precision hypothesis. First, we will
describe empirical studies that directly assess—or speak to—
neurobiological correlates of prediction errors and their suppres-
sion in autism. Secondly, we will discuss the neuromodulatory
gain control mechanisms that are implicated in encoding pre-
cision, and evidence pertaining to their disruption in autism.
We finish by considering how the aberrant precision account
of autism differs from other related recent accounts of autism.
Although there is a large amount of evidence for predictive coding
per se, the evidence for aberrant precision in autism (APA) is—at
this stage—circumstantial and suggestive. Our main purpose is to
motivate a process theory that equips functionalist or normative
accounts with a biological mechanism and thereby highlight
outstanding questions that, in principle, could be resolved using
psychophysical and electrophysiological studies.
PERCEPTION AND ACTION IN AUTISM
PREDICTIVE CODING IN THE BRAIN
Our treatment will focus on the role of precision in predictive
coding. Predictive coding is a neurobiologically plausible account
of circumstantial physiological and anatomical evidence for pre-
dictive coding in the brain—ranging from formal or theoretical
treatments (reviewed in Friston, 2008), through the anatomy of
extrinsic connectivity and canonical microcircuits (reviewed in
Bastos et al., 2012), to the functional architecture of the motor
system (reviewed in Adams et al., 2013a). In this setting, pre-
cision is thought to be mediated by the gain or excitability of
(superficial pyramidal) cells encoding prediction errors (Feldman
and Friston, 2010; Shipp et al., 2013). We will adopt this the-
oretical perspective as a starting point for considering autism;
acknowledging that there are many other interesting issues that
can be addressed in terms of precision (for example attention,
affordance, visual search, illusions etc., Feldman and Friston,
2010; Adams et al., 2013a,b; Brown et al., 2013). When appro-
priate, we will refer to the (computational and psychophysical)
literature on precision to highlight the explicit connections with
pathophysiology in autism.
SENSORY ATTENUATION
Subjective or expected precision can play a key role in modulating
the dynamics of perception. For example, if the precision of
sensory evidence is increased, or if top-down prior preci-
sion is decreased, perception (posterior beliefs or expectations)
will be dominated by sensory input. In other words, if you
expect highly precise sensory input, you will increase the gain
of sensory prediction errors at the expense of higher level
expectations. Consequently, generalizable high-level causal struc-
ture will be sacrificed to accommodate overly accurate explana-
tions of (potentially noisy) bottom-up sensory input. Autistic
perception has previously been characterized by just such a lack of
central coherence (Frith and Happé, 1994); specifically, a superior
focus on the local aspects of a scene at the expense of the global
“bigger picture” that is accompanied by an overwhelming sense of
“sensory overload” (Simmons et al., 2009). These observations are
supported by a plethora of behavioral data demonstrating impair-
ments of individuals with autism in tasks that require integration
of global attributes—such as global motion coherence (Milne
et al., 2002; Pellicano et al., 2005), and superior performance
on tasks that require identification of the individual parts of a
visual stimulus—such as visual search (O’Riordan et al., 2001;
O’riordan, 2004) and the embedded figures test (EFT; Frith and
Happé, 1994; Happé, 1999; though see White and Saldaña, 2011).
A common finding, across a number of functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies investigating the EFT
in autism, is increased visual cortical activation, and decreased
prefrontal activation in autistic participants relative to controls
(Ring et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2007; Manjaly et al., 2007). Increased
visual cortical activation in spatial-contextual processing tasks is
typically interpreted as being consistent with increased bottom-
up visual processing in autism. In the context of predictive
coding, cortical responses are generally considered an index of
(precision weighted) prediction errors (Friston, 2005). As such,
these findings are consistent with the exuberant (stimulus-bound)
production (and perceptual resolution) of sensory prediction
errors, whose precision has not been appropriately attenuated.
A key tenet of this explanation is that high sensory precision
in autism, relative to prior precision, may be caused by a failure
of sensory attenuation. In other words, an inability to contextu-
alize sensory information renders sensory prediction errors too
precise and context insensitive. The effects of sensory precision
can present in several guises. For example, repeating a stimulus
generally leads to an adaptive attenuation of evoked neuronal
responses. This is termed repetition suppression or adaptation in
fMRI, and has been studied with the mismatch negativity (MMN)
in electroencephalography (EEG). This effect can be understood
as the suppression of prediction errors as the stimulus becomes
more predictable (Summerfield et al., 2008; Ewbank et al., 2011).
However, this repetition suppression can be reversed by atten-
tion (Kok et al., 2012)—an effect that can be attributed to an
(attentional) increase in sensory precision (Feldman and Friston,
2010). Conversely, the exuberant responses associated with the
MMN can, in part, the attributed to a failure to attenuate sensory
precision during the processing of unexpected “oddball” stimuli
(Garrido et al., 2009). Under conditions of high sensory precision,
modeled and pharmacologically modulated MMN responses are
diminished due to a failure to attenuate responses to repeated
“standard” stimuli (Moran et al., 2013). Some MMN studies
in autistic children also indicate diminished MMN amplitudes
(Dunn et al., 2008) and latencies (Gomot et al., 2011) relative to
neurotypical controls.
Though attempts to synthesize the MMN literature in autism
reveal many inconsistencies (Marco et al., 2011), this may be
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due to differences in attentional demands used in different tasks
(Dunn et al., 2008), which is consistent with the notion that
attention is mediated by changes in expected precision during
perception (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Vossel et al., 2013).
Indeed, recent reports of larger extrastriate population receptive
field maps (pRF) in autism (Schwarzkopf et al., 2014) echo the
finding that pRFs increase under conditions of high attentional
load (de Haas et al., 2014). This suggests that increased receptive
fields in autistic subjects may reflect a failure to attenuate sensory
precision.
One fMRI study has shown a failure to habituate to repeated
presentations of the same faces in autism and, remarkably, the
extent of this failure correlates with symptom severity (Kleinhans
et al., 2009). These findings are consistent with a failure to
suppress and contextualize prediction errors pertaining to the
identity of faces over time. The consequence of this failure,
especially for lower level sensory features, would be a constant
state of sensory attentiveness, consistent with symptoms of
sensory overload and oversensitivity to sensory stimulation in
autism. The implication of these observations is that further
studies of repetition (and expectation; Larsson and Smith, 2012;
Todorovic and de Lange, 2012) suppression may be especially
useful in establishing and quantifying a failure to contextualize or
attenuate sensory precision in autism.
REPRESENTING AND RESPONDING TO UNCERTAINTY
Another perceptual phenomenon that demonstrates the inferen-
tial nature of perception, and speaks to the balance of sensory
drive relative to prior predictions, is binocular rivalry (Hohwy
et al., 2008). When two different images are presented to each
eye at the same time, one does not tend to perceive a fusion
or mixture of the two images—as would be consistent with
the (available) sensory evidence; instead, perception alternates
between each monocular image as if trying to resolve the Bayesian
inverse problem with prior beliefs about the causes of sensations.
This Bayesian perspective is endorsed by studies showing that
increasing the prior likelihood of one image can increase the
duration that image is perceived relative to the competing image
(Denison et al., 2011). Crucially, a recent binocular rivalry study
of individuals with autism revealed increased durations of fused
(mixed) percepts relative to controls—and also slower rates of
perceptual alternation (Robertson et al., 2013; though see Said
et al., 2013 for a negative result using simple stimuli). Robertson
et al. note that simulations of binocular rivalry predict longer
duration of mixed percepts by reducing neuronal inhibition or
competition among high-level explanations for the sensory input.
This is consistent with increased sensory precision, relative to the
precision of prior beliefs that only one object can cause sensations
at any one time (Hohwy et al., 2008).
Many visual illusions arise as a consequence of Bayes-optimal
perception in artificially constructed circumstances. In the case of
visual illusions, prior expectations generally reflect statistical reg-
ularities in the environment—and either arise from experience,
such as the “light comes from above” prior (Adams et al., 2004) or
may be hard-coded in the functional architecture of visual cortex.
The illusory percept is “optimal” in that it is the best percept to
explain the ambiguous sensory input on offer.
Interestingly, autistic individuals are reported to be less sus-
ceptible to a number of simple visual illusions (Happé, 1999).
Additionally, a recent study shows that people with autism do
experience the Sheppard illusion, although the magnitude is
reduced (Mitchell et al., 2010) and autistic traits in a non-clinical
sample have been shown to predict visual illusion magnitude
for the rod-and-frame, Roelofs, Ponzo and Poggendorff illusions
(Walter et al., 2009). Differences in the way visual illusions are
administered and measured may account for contradictory results
suggesting that people with autism experience visual illusions
in the same way as neurotypicals (Mitchell and Ropar, 2004).
Heterogeneity within the disorder (in precision dynamics con-
trolled my neuromodulators—see below) may also account high
variability in reported visual illusion magnitudes.
In neurotypicals, empirical and modeling studies of simul-
taneous luminance contrast illusions—under different levels of
sensory precision—indicate that at very high levels of sensory
precision, illusory percepts disappear (Brown and Friston, 2012).
Although no studies have investigated these particular illusions in
autism, the link between the precision of sensory evidence and
the propensity to perceive illusory precepts offers an intriguing
explanation for reports of reduced susceptibility to certain visual
illusions in autism (and schizophrenia: e.g., Adams et al., 2013b).
Both rivalrous stimuli and visual illusions provide examples of
perceptual uncertainty; circumstances where the available sensory
evidence for a given perceptual “event” is ambiguous or imprecise.
However, across time, uncertainty can also vary (this is called
volatility) and adaptive behavior also rests on the accurate estima-
tion of fluctuations in the precision (or inverse variability) of envi-
ronmental contingencies. This estimation determines the weight
one should place on sensory evidence relative to prior beliefs.
Computational-fMRI studies have found trial-by-trial represen-
tations of environmental volatility in the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC; Behrens et al., 2007; den Ouden et al., 2010). Interestingly,
structural (Haznedar et al., 1997) and functional (Lane et al.,
1998) abnormalities in the ACC have been reported in autism and
one fMRI study found increased activation in the ACC in autistic
relative to neurotypical participants in a visual “oddball” detec-
tion task (Dichter et al., 2009). In this study, there were two types
of oddball stimuli, “target” stimuli were infrequent but expected
and “novel” stimuli were equally infrequent but unexpected. The
authors found increased ACC response to targets, relative to
novel stimuli, in the autism group. This could be interpreted as
a failure to expect the unexpected—and further evidence for a
failure to contextualize sensory processing in autism, in the face
of uncertainty.
Finally, under the predictive coding framework, action
changes sensory input in an attempt to minimize sensory
(e.g., proprioceptive) prediction errors. This is usually cast in
terms of classical motor reflexes involving the spinal-cord and
cranial nerve nuclei (see Adams et al., 2013a; Shipp et al., 2013
for a review of the underlying functional anatomy). In this aspect
of predictive coding, i.e., active inference, perception is entrained
by action and sensory attenuation plays a key permissive role
in action. Repetitive or stereotyped behaviors, clinically known
as “stimming” (Wing, 1996), are characteristic of autism; these
include behaviors such as hand flapping, head banging, and
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rocking back and forth. Within the predictive coding framework,
stimming behaviors can be seen as attempts to create a sense of
control via successful minimization of prediction errors through
repetition of self-generated actions. In neurotypicals, there is a
large body of evidence supporting the notion that the sensory
consequences, and neural signatures, of self-generated actions
are attenuated relative to externally generated actions—and a
failure of this sensory attenuation in schizophrenia (Adams et al.,
2013a; Shergill et al., 2014). In a state where all sensory inputs
are in a sense unexpected, or associated with abnormally precise
prediction errors, stimming, a predilection for sameness and a
resistance to change become adaptive coping strategies—a way
for individuals with autism to predict the sensory input they are
receiving such that predictions or expectations are fulfilled in a
consistent way. This is consistent with the (functionalist) view
articulated by Pellicano and Burr (2012), but neurobiologically
grounded in precision dynamics and synaptic gain control in the
central nervous system (Adams et al., 2013b).
It is worth noting that, in addition to hypersensitivity
to sensory stimulation, many people with autism can report
hyposensitivities (Rogers and Ozonoff, 2005; Ben-Sasson et al.,
2009). In addition to the coping strategies described above,
withdrawal into oneself (American Psychiatric Association, 2013),
can be seen as a means of avoiding the exuberant production
of prediction errors. Such behavior resembles the “dark room
problem” for predictive coding: if we are trying to minimize
prediction errors, we might consider avoiding sensory stimulation
and retire to a dark and quiet room (Friston et al., 2012b). An
alternative explanation for withdrawal rests upon the failure to
acquire internal models that are necessary for interaction with
the world; particularly models of others that underlie prosocial
exchange. This secondary consequence—of a primary failure
to attenuate sensory precision—speaks to neurodevelopmental
theories of autism. In summary, under predictive coding, the
coping “atypical” behaviors produced by both hypersensitivity
to sensory stimulation, and consequent withdrawal from affilia-
tive and prosocial stimuli, can be seen as attempts to minimize
the exuberant production of prediction errors resulting from
imprecision in the balance of sensory evidence and top-down
beliefs.
SOCIAL INTERACTION IN AUTISM: THE GREATEST UNCERTAINTY?
So far, we have proposed that a single underlying pathology, aber-
rant encoding of precision, can explain the prominent features of
autistic sensation, perception and action. Central to the theory of
APA is the role of uncertainty. It is in uncertain situations that
we rely most on our prior beliefs to contextualize and inform
our perception. This means, one would expect the most marked
deficits in perception and action in unpredictable situations that
would normally call on precise prior beliefs. This provides a
simple explanation for the pronounced social-communication
difficulties in autism; given that other agents are arguably the most
difficult things to predict. In the complex world of social inter-
actions, the many-to-one mappings between causes and sensory
input are dramatically increased and difficult to learn; especially
if one cannot contextualize the prediction errors that drive that
learning (Adams et al., 2013b).
Neuroimaging studies investigating contextual contributions
to social interaction in autism are lacking. One fMRI study
has demonstrated that neurotypical adults show a prediction
error-like response in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) when
eye gaze behavior violates expectations about where other people
“ought to look”. Although autistic subjects show activity in the
STS for dynamic shifts in eye gaze, they do not demonstrate this
predictive effect (Pelphrey et al., 2005). This suggests a failure
to predict gaze behavior in other people. Another fMRI study
investigated how autistic children and neurotypical controls use
contextual cues to interpret ironic verbal statements. They found
group specific behavioral and neural differences: specifically,
autistic children performed above chance but were less accurate
than control children when relying on contextual information
to interpret speech content. When interpreting the meaning of
ambiguous utterances, the autistic group showed greater acti-
vation in inferior frontal and temporal brain regions (Wang
et al., 2006). The authors argue this increased neural response
reflects more effortful processing in the autism group, when try-
ing to interpret the ambiguous meaning of utterances. However,
increased activity in these regions could also be interpreted as an
index of unsuppressed prediction errors, when content (the actual
words spoken) and intended meaning (conveyed by contextual
cues) could not be reconciled.
SUMMARY
Inferring the environment’s statistical structure and adapt-
ing behavior accordingly, is a fundamental problem that the
brain appears to have solved. In the preceding section we
reviewed empirical studies that directly assess—or speak to—
neurobiological correlates of prediction errors and their sup-
pression in autism. In so doing, we reviewed perception, action
and social interaction during instances of high perceptual and
environmental uncertainty and the, admittedly limited, evidence
offered from existing studies is consistent with an imbalance of
the precision ascribed to sensory evidence relative to prior beliefs.
In particular, inappropriately high sensory precision may arise as
a failure to attenuate sensory signals (i.e., a failure to contextualize
sensory information in an optimal way) via top-down gain con-
trol. This, in turn, raises questions about perceptual learning and
the acquisition of hierarchical models in the brain which we will
return to later. Perhaps the most important inferences we make
are about the intentions of others, which is clearly relevant for
autism—and speaks to formal models of interpersonal inference
as a promising avenue for autism research (e.g., Moutoussis et al.,
2014).
THE NEUROMODULATORY BASIS OF PRECISION
This section considers predictive coding as the neurobiological
instantiation of Bayesian inference, where (expected) precision is
mediated by the post-synaptic gain of superficial pyramidal cells
encoding the prediction error (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Adams
et al., 2013b; Shipp et al., 2013). The premise is that the perceptual
and behavioral characteristics of autism can be considered as
false inference about the causes of sensory input due to a failure
attenuate sensory precision, relative to prior precision. Neurobio-
logically, this translates into a failure of (top-down) postsynaptic
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gain control of neuronal populations in the superficial cortical
layers of sensory cortex. Post-synaptic gain gates the influence
of presynaptic inputs on postsynaptic outputs and is determined
by a number of factors. One key determinant of synaptic gain is
the action of classical neuromodulators including acetylcholine,
dopamine and serotonin. In what follows, we will briefly review
the evidence for alterations in these neuromodulatory systems
in autism, and how these alterations might relate to aberrant
precision weighting in the disorder.
GLUTAMATE/GABA
It has been hypothesized for over a decade that autism might
have a hypoglutamatergic basis: Abnormalities of the glutamate
neurotransmitter system have been found in autism post mortem
(Purcell et al., 2001) and a recent study showed that subcortical
glutamate is reduced in autistic adults (Horder et al., 2013).
Remarkably, baseline subcortical glutamate was found to correlate
negatively with social communication impairments. In neurotyp-
icals, visual γ-band (30–70 Hz) activity—that has been associated
with the broadcasting of prediction errors (Arnal et al., 2011)—
correlates with concurrently measured glutamate levels; demon-
strating a functional role for glutamate in shaping the dynamics of
visual cortical responses (Lally et al., 2014). In predictive coding,
NMDA glutamate receptors (NMDAR’s) are hypothesized to play
a role in gain control and contextual modulation (Friston, 2002,
2005). Hypoglutamatergic pathology in autism would therefore
be consistent with context insensitive sensory drive and functional
failures to optimize precision. In particular slow-acting voltage
sensitive NMDAR’s are hypothesized to modulate feedback influ-
ences from higher-levels of processing onto lower levels (Friston,
2002, 2005) and so hypoglutamatergic pathology in autism would
imply reduced prior precision in higher cortical areas. Indeed one
possible mechanism that we offer for increased sensory precision
is a failure of sensory attenuation (see above), which itself implies
a reduced top-down influence on sensory drive.
While there are some important limitations on the appli-
cability of mouse-models of cognition to human disorders,
adult NR1(neo-/-) transgenic mice, which demonstrate NMDAR
hypo-function, show abnormal behaviors consistent with autism
symptoms, including: reduced social interactions, repetitive self-
injurious behavior and sensory hypersensitivity. Gandal et al.
(2012) recently investigated sensory processing in NR1(neo-/-)
mice and found many sensory electrophysiological endopheno-
types consistent with human studies of autism, including reduced
pre-pulse inhibition (a measure of sensory gating) (Yuhas et al.,
2011), reduced auditory-evoked latencies (Roberts et al., 2010)
and reduced γ-band synchrony (Gandal et al., 2010). This encour-
aging mouse-model of autism may provide a preliminary link
between hypo-glutamatergic pathology and the precision-based
gating of ascending sensory signals (i.e., prediction errors).
ACETYLCHOLINE
There is a large body of evidence linking acetylcholine to the
encoding of perceptual and environmental uncertainty; in partic-
ular suggesting a role for acetylcholine in suppressing top-down
influence on stimulus driven cortical responses (Yu and Dayan,
2005). Recently, optogenetic stimulation of the basal forebrain,
the main source of cholinergic modulation in the cortex, has been
shown to enhance V1 responses to visual inputs, desynchronise
neural spiking and produce a behavioral improvement in tests
of visual discrimination (Pinto et al., 2013). Conversely, basal
forebrain inactivation depresses visual responses, synchronizes
spiking and impairs discrimination performance—providing an
elegant demonstration of how acetylcholine can modulate the
(putative) precision of visual prediction errors. In the auditory
domain, cholinesterase inhibition attenuates neural suppression
in humans as a function of stimulus repetition (Moran et al.,
2013). This is consistent with acetylcholine increasing the preci-
sion of sensory prediction errors, resulting in a failure to attenuate
overall electrophysiological response with stimulus repetition.
In autism, reports of basal forebrain neuron pathology
(Kemper and Bauman, 1998), morphological abnormalities (Riva
et al., 2011) and reduced cortical cholinergic receptor function
(Perry et al., 2001) are consistent with the idea of aberrant cholin-
ergic encoding of precision in autism, and selective cholinergic
interventions are considered a fruitful avenue for development
of autism therapeutics (Deutsch et al., 2010). In another recent
mouse model of autism, systematically increasing the availability
of acetylcholine was found to alleviate behavioral symptoms
consistent with autism (Karvat and Kimchi, 2013). While at first
this might seem at odds with the suggestion of increased sensory
precision in autism it is worth noting that the strain of mice used
in this study express chronically low brain acetylcholine levels in
the medial prefrontal cortex (McTighe et al., 2013). This might
indicate that the behavioral effects reported in Karvat and Kimchi
(2013) arise by restoring medial prefrontal acetylcholine availabil-
ity; i.e., restoring precision dynamics at higher cortical levels such
that sensory precision is no longer (relatively) high. However,
while there are many reports of abnormal medial prefrontal cortex
function in autism (Gilbert et al., 2008; Watanabe et al., 2012),
there is, at present, little neurochemical evidence for low brain
acetylcholine levels in human autism.
Furthermore, acetylcholine is not only involved in “attention-
like” (Feldman and Friston, 2010) modulation of perception, but
is also implicated in widespread facilitation of many cognitive
processes, including novelty processing (Pepeu and Giovannini,
2004), conscious awareness and sleep states (Perry et al., 1999)
and interacts with other monoaminergic neurotransmitter sys-
tems. In summary, acetylcholine may mediate the dynamics of
precision in perceptual inference and may be an important candi-
date target for pathophysiology in autism. At this stage, however,
more pharmacological and neuroimaging studies are necessary
to better characterize the role of cholinergic neuromodulation in
autism.
MONOAMINES
Detailed investigations of the serotonin and dopamine systems in
autism are sadly lacking and the studies that do exist are far from
conclusive. Clinical observations suggest that dopamine-blocking
antipsychotic drugs reduce repetitive and self-injurious behaviors
in autism (Posey et al., 2008) and studies indicate that dopamine
transporter binding is significantly higher in the orbitofrontal
cortex of autistic adults relative to controls (Nakamura et al.,
2010). In the context of active inference, dopamine is proposed to
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mediate the precision of cues (with affordance) that induce behav-
ior (Friston et al., 2012a). Additionally, dopamine is converted
to norepinephrine pre-synaptically via the action of dopamine
β-hydroxylase (DBH). This means that dopamine and DBH
availability are crucial determinants of norepinephrine function.
Norepinephrine itself has a demonstrable role in encoding “unex-
pected uncertainty” in perceptual learning tasks (Yu and Dayan,
2005), and norepinephrine/DBH abnormalities in autism are
some of the earliest (Lake et al., 1977) and most consistent neuro-
biological findings in people, and first-degree relatives (Robinson
et al., 2001), with autism.
Other monoamines, such as serotonin have been implicated
in the pathophysiology of autism (Harrington et al., 2013).
Empirically, serotonin transporter binding is negatively correlated
with dopamine transporter binding in the orbitofrontal cortex
of people with autism and, across the whole brain, global sero-
tonin transporter binding is reduced (Nakamura et al., 2010).
This is suggestive of a role for serotonin/dopamine interactions
in the neuromodulatory pathophysiology of autism. Common
anti-depressant drugs, which block the reuptake of serotonin,
are routinely prescribed to treat the core-symptoms of autism.
However, a review of randomized control trials suggests there is
limited evidence overall for the efficacy of serotonergic treatments
(Kolevzon et al., 2006). Interestingly, serotonin has a neuromodu-
latory effect on cortical inhibition and excitation via interactions
with glutamate and GABA (Ciranna, 2006), a potential route by
which SSRIs could be efficacious in treating some individuals with
autism, via gain control of cortical responses reporting prediction
errors.
OXYTOCIN
Oxytocin is a neuromodulatory hormone that plays a critical role
in gestation and interacts with many of the neuromodulators
outlined above (Richard et al., 1991). Plasma oxytocin levels are
reduced in autistic children (Modahl et al., 1998) and intranasal
oxytocin administration increases facial emotion recognition and
amygdala responses to emotional faces in adults with Asperger
syndrome (Domes et al., 2014). A recent study suggests that
oxytocin increases the salience of socially meaningful stimuli,
and attenuates the saliency of non-social stimuli, in children
with autism (Gordon et al., 2013). This might suggest that
oxytocin plays a role in contextualizing the precision of social
and non-social cues. Mechanistically, this could be mediated via
oxytocin-glutamate interactions that have been shown to modu-
late sensory-motor gating (Feifel and Reza, 1999). By implication,
aberrant oxytocin function in autism may be manifest as a failure
to contextualize and differentially attenuate multimodal cues—
especially interoceptive cues either as a direct result of oxytocin
dysfunction or as a result of subsequent failures of social learning.
SUMMARY
In the preceding section, we considered the putative neuromodu-
latory basis of how precision is mediated in the brain and evidence
of abnormalities in these neuromodulatory systems in autism.
The relative action and influence of these neurotransmitters may
be largely related to timing, with NMDAR’s modulating the gain
of sensory prediction errors, perhaps locally, over relatively short
temporal contexts (in the order of ∼50 ms) (Friston, 2005)
and neuromodulators like dopamine, acetylcholine and serotonin
perhaps shaping the more enduring (contextual) aspects of preci-
sion in fronto-striatal and sensory systems (Corlett et al., 2009).
To assert that the aberrant encoding of precision is the single
underlying neuropathology in autism is a broad statement that
is intended to acknowledge the myriad interacting neuromodula-
tory systems that may be involved.
In one sense, the potential explanatory potential of the aber-
rant precision proposal is that it accommodates a diversity of
neuromodulatory mechanisms under one functional umbrella;
namely the mediation of precision in hierarchical predictive
coding. Furthermore, deficits in this singular function have the
potential to explain a wide range of perceptual and behavioral
abnormalities—of which a striking number are found in autism.
RELATED ACCOUNTS OF AUTISM
A recent influential proposal suggested that attenuated Bayesian
priors might be responsible for the unique perceptual experiences
in autism (Pellicano and Burr, 2012). Our commentary on that
article suggested that under predictive coding, prior precision—
encoded by neuromodulatory gain control mechanisms—may
be attenuated in autism, relative to sensory precision (Friston
et al., 2013). Related discussions also viewed predictive coding
as a plausible framework to understand autistic perception (van
Boxtel and Lu, 2013) and also suggested that individuals with
autism might exhibit high precision at the sensory level (Brock,
2012; Van de Cruys et al., 2013) which may result in highly
precise priors (Van de Cruys et al., 2013). Although, from the
functional perspective, a decrease in prior precision results in the
same posterior expectations as an increase in sensory precision;
we have focused on the neurobiological mechanisms, suggesting
that high sensory precision may arise as a failure to attenuate
sensory precision and thereby contextualize sensory evidence in
relation to prior beliefs.
Although mechanistically distinct, both overly precise
estimates of sensory precision and under-precise estimates of
prior precision would produce the same functional consequences;
i.e., perception/interaction that lies closer to the sensory input
and is insensitive to context. Here, we extend this notion to
suggest that the sensory problems, repetitive and stereotyped
behaviors and difficulties with social interaction in autism may
all lie in the delicate balance of precision ascribed to sensory
evidence relative to prior beliefs. Even if the primary deficit
is expressed at the sensory level of cortical hierarchies, the
secondary consequences of this, in terms of perceptual learning
(and compensatory changes in neuromodulation at higher
levels), necessarily requires one to consider the central role of
hierarchical inference in perception and behavior. In this sense
statistically “optimal” perception and learning go hand in hand
and the relative updating of precision is just as important for
sensation, perception and social interaction as the updating of
predictions. See Mathys et al. (2011) for a formal illustration of
this in the context of hierarchical Bayesian modeling of volatility.
Individual variability in basic physiological mechanisms,
such as neuromodulatory function, may give rise to individual
differences in learning and such differences may explain the
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heterogeneous nature of psychiatric diseases (Stephan et al.,
2009). Indeed, some of the inherent heterogeneity of symptoms
and behaviors within and between individuals with autism may
be due to “state” problems with precision-weighting and the
consequent (possibly compensatory) alterations to expected
precision in higher levels of the cortical hierarchy. In support
of this notion, recent study employing signal detection (SDT)
measures found evidence in favor of attenuated priors in shaping
perceptual inference in people with high levels of autistic traits
(Skewes et al., 2014). In this case, the authors compared SDT
measures that putatively map on to sensory precision and also
prior beliefs and found it was the influence of prior beliefs that
differed between high-and low autistic traits groups. In line with
this finding, estimated individual differences in perceptual priors
have been shown to predict perceptual performance in neurotyp-
ical adults (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006). As such, individual
differences (in precision-weighting) of learned expectations can
shape individual differences in perception (Seriès and Seitz, 2013)
and this is likely to vary between individuals across the autistic
spectrum and also within the same individual. The implication
of our formulation is that the normal variations in precision
weighting become pathological in autism, or express themselves
pathologically in situations where uncertainty is high.
We note that an aberrant precision account of autism—
and associated normative accounts (Pellicano and Burr, 2012)
accommodate many of the experimental findings that lead to
existing theories of autistic behavior such as: a reduced sensitivity
to context (Frith and Happé, 1994), general difficulties with
predictability (Gomot and Wicker, 2012), difficulties with Theory
of Mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), reduced “top-down” control
(Happé and Frith, 2006) and enhanced “bottom-up” functioning
(Mottron et al., 2009). Anchoring Bayesian inference, specifically
false inference, in predictive coding has the advantage of speaking
to these cognitive, theoretical and normative accounts in a robust
neurobiological and formal language (see Friston and Kiebel,
2009 for a detailed mathematical implementation of predictive
coding, and Mathys et al., 2011 for learning under uncertainty).
SUMMARY
There are four key points that summarize the perspective offered
by aberrant precision, in relation to its implicit normative
account of autism. First, predictive coding and aberrant precision
offer a neurobiological mechanism for the Bayesian formulation
of Pellicano and Burr (2012). We have tried to substantiate this
by drawing on computational and empirical evidence for an
imbalance of sensory precision relative to top-down precision.
Second, we have emphasized that the importance of sensory
precision relative to the precision of prior beliefs, where an
inaccurate estimate of either can, in principle, produce the same
phenomenology. Specifically we outline an adaptive mechanism
(a failure of sensory attenuation) that could underlie increased
sensory precision. Third, we stress the importance of the dynamic
evolution of precision at different temporal scales and levels of
the cortical hierarchy (cf. Mathys et al., 2011). An important
temporal scale here includes the learning of (relatively invariant)
model parameters that renders the acquisition of generative
models—particularly of self vs. others—sensitive to aberrant
precision. Finally we highlight the fact that expected or subjective
precision is not necessarily fixed and individual differences in
the (tonic vs. phasic) availability of different neuromodulators
can shape the perception and learning in both neurotypical and
autistic people.
The debate between low “hypo-priors” (Pellicano and Burr,
2012) and decreased sensory noise (Brock, 2012) can be usefully
contextualized under hierarchical predictive coding: the issue here
is whether precision is too low at higher (prior) levels of the hier-
archy, or too high at lower (sensory) levels. The original article by
Pellicano and Burr did not refer to the mechanisms of predictive
coding and offered a state (as if) account of autism. In contrast,
predictive coding is a process theory that renders the distinction
between aberrant precision at high and low hierarchical levels
much more prescient. Functionally, we have noted that posterior
expectations (although not posterior confidence) depend on,
and only on, the relative hierarchical precision (e.g., Mathys
et al., 2011). However, from a pathophysiological perspective,
the hierarchical level of insult is clearly important. Although this
issue is not easy to resolve given the current empirical evidence,
our emphasis on a failure of sensory attenuation speaks more to
Brock’s perspective than imprecise priors. Although the posterior
expectation is unaffected by the relative precision, the posterior
confidence will show opposite effects—with increasing posterior
confidence under a failure to attenuate sensory precision and
a decrease in posterior confidence with a loss of precise priors.
Probing these predicted opposite effects will permit future
empirical studies to begin to resolve this matter. Although this
is an important issue, we have also emphasized that secondary
changes in subjective precision (and perceptual learning) distant
from the primary pathology may be an important etiological
factor—particularly in a neurodevelopmental setting.
CONCLUSIONS
Expectations about the precision of sensory inputs, relative to
the precision of prior beliefs—encoded by neuromodulatory gain
control mechanisms—may play a central role in coordinating the
dynamics of perception, action, and social behavior. Here, we
suggest that abnormalities in autistic perception, action and social
interaction can be explained by an imbalance of the precision
ascribed to sensory evidence relative to prior beliefs. We have
attempted to demonstrate, with supportive empirical evidence,
that the aberrant encoding of precision provides a parsimonious
means of linking the sensory difficulties in autism to the perva-
sive social-communication problems. In particular, this account
predicts the most pervasive difficulties in autism should emerge
when environmental uncertainty is high, such as interpreting
ambiguous or imprecise sensory input during visual illusions,
rivalrous stimuli, and during social exchanges.
The aberrant precision account of autism has sufficient mech-
anistic and neurobiological specificity to generate testable and
falsifiable hypotheses using clinical, behavioral, neuroimaging,
pharmacological and computational modeling methods. While
we acknowledge that the evidence for the aberrant precision
account of autism is only suggestive at present, it is hoped that
this principled functional and biologically grounded approach
to psychopathology and pathophysiology of autism will generate
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new empirical studies, novel hypotheses and ultimately contribute
to a better understanding of its neurobiological basis.
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